Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

State of Utah v. Ralph Leroy Menzies : Reply Brief
of appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Charlene Barlow; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
appellee.
Joan C. Watt, Richard G. Uday; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Menzies, No. 880161.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2105

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

PnC'IMrNT
Kr''
45.9
,S9

POCKET NO..

CHIEF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgment and conviction for Capital Homicide, a
capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1953 as
amended), and Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953 as amended), in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

Pursuant to

the Order of this Court dated February 20, 1991 granting
"Appellant's Motion to Hear and Decide Transcript Issues and Stay
Briefing of Other Issues," this brief covers only those issues
relating to the adequacy of the transcript in the instant case.
JOAN C. WATT
RICHARD G. UDAY
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLENE BARLOW
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

F
MAY 3 0 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgment and conviction for Capital Homicide, a
capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1953 as
amended), and Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953 as amended), in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

Pursuant to

the Order of this Court dated February 20, 1991 granting
"Appellant's Motion to Hear and Decide Transcript Issues and Stay
Briefing of Other Issues," this brief covers only those issues
relating to the adequacy of the transcript in the instant case.
JOAN C. WATT
RICHARD G. UDAY
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLENE BARLOW
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

11

INTRODUCTION

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH STATUTES AND RULES PRECLUDE THE USE
OF A TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY ANYONE OTHER THAN A
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AS THE OFFICIAL
RECORD ON APPEAL.

4

POINT II. MANDATORY REVIEW OF THIS CAPITAL
HOMICIDE CASE IS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE AN ACCURATE.
VERBATIM RECORD DOES NOT EXIST.

11

A. THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF
ESTABLISHING THE ACCURACY OF THE
TRANSCRIPT

11

B. NEITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT IS
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE "MEANINGFUL APPELLATE
REVIEW" IN THIS CASE

13

C. NO SHOWING OF SPECIFIC PREJUDICE IS
REQUIRED IN A CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASE WHERE
AN ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST. . .

21

POINT III. MR. MENZIES WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE
FROM THE USE OF EITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT.

22

/

POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW MR. MENZIES
CLAIMS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION.

24

POINT V. REMOVING THE PROSECUTORS STATEMENTS
DOES NOT REMOVE THE PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE
REMARKS

24

CONCLUSION

25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
Delap v. State. 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977)
Dunn v. State. 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987)
Emig v. Hayward. 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985)
Felton v. State. 523 So.2d 775 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988)
Flannerv v. Flannery. 536 P.2d 136 (Utah 1975)

...

Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2716, 33
L.Ed.2d 46 (1972)
Hardy v. United States. 375 U.S. 277, 11 L.Ed.2d 331,
84 S.Ct. 424 (1964)
In re David T.. 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. 4th 1976)
Kellv v. State. 692 P.2d 563 (Okl. Cr. 1984)

....

Little v. State. 97 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Cr. App. 1936) .
People v. Chessman. 35 Ca.2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, cert.
denied. 340 U.S. 840 (1950)
People v. Chessman. 52 Ca.2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, cert.
denied. 361 U.S. 925 (1959)
Pullan v. Fulbriqht. 685 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1985) . . .
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (1990)
State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990)
State v. Perrv. 136 Wis.2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987)
State v. Sanders. 321 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. 1984)
(per curiam)
State v. Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983)

ii

12,
13,

Page
Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 (Okl. Cr. 1988)

. .

21

STATUTES CITED
Art. 1, § 9, Utah Constitution

24

Art. 1, § 10, Utah Constitution

24

Art. 1, § 12, Utah Constitution

24

Art. VIII, § 5, Utah Constitution

24

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-13 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 (1953 as amended)

8
3,5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 (1987)

3, 5, 12

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15 (1987)

5, 6, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17

6, 7, 8

Rules of Appellate Procedure

3,5

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990) . .

11, 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Rule 3-304, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1990)

8, 9

Rule 3-305, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1988)

4, 9

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 880161
Priority No. 1

:
INTRODUCTION

Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement of the
Issues and Standards of Review, Statement of the Case, and Statement
of the Facts are contained in Appellant's opening brief at 1-15.
Mr. Menzies relies on those statements and makes the following brief
replies.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The State is incorrect that the federal and state
constitutional issues raised in this appeal were not raised below
and are therefore subject to a plain error standard.
brief at 2.

See State's

The arguments that use of this transcript would violate

the state and federal constitution were some of the bases for
Mr. Menzies' Motion for New Trial.

R. 1223-5; 1237-49; 1630-2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Judge Uno's order does not "certify" the original
transcript.

Instead, it states:

The original transcript, prepared by the
notereader, shall be transmitted to the Utah
Supreme Court based upon the finding that despite
numerous errors, the original transcript is
sufficiently accurate to afford a full and fair
review of his issues to be raised on appeal.

See Order contained in Addendum E to Appellant's opening brief.
Judge Uno also transmitted the "California transcript" to this Court
as part of the record on appeal.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In addition to the facts outlined in Mr. Menzies' opening
brief, Mr. Menzies outlines the following facts.
The suggestion by the State that Ms. Lee was a temporary
reporter disregards all of the evidence in Ms. Lee's personnel file
that she was appointed as the official reporter for Judge Uno to
replace Bob Lewis.

See Defendant's Exhibit 3; see also discussion

infra at 6-8.
Although the Court Administrator's office did make an
arrangement with Ms. Lee whereby she was placed on leave with pay
during alternate weeks to complete this transcript (R. 1166:69),
nothing in the record suggests that the Court Administrator's office
knew of or condoned the extensive role played by the notereader and
proofreader in the preparation of the transcript.

See Defendant's

Exhibit 3; R. 1166:69, 70; Addendum J to Appellant's opening brief.
Ron Gibson made special arrangements whereby Ms. Lee was permitted
to work at home based on Ms. Lee's representation that she needed to
use her computer at home to prepare the Menzies transcripts.
R. 1166:77.
According to Ms. Lee, during those five weeks of full-time
leave, the only effort she made toward preparation of the
transcripts was to read portions of pages to which the notereader
had attached a paperclip.

R. 1166:173-7.

- 2
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She did not type,

proofread, correct, or otherwise prepare the transcripts.
Although Ms. Lee was terminated for a number of reasons,
problems with the Menzies case are mentioned several times in her
personnel file, and she was relieved of her responsibility in
Judge Uno's courtroom in order to complete the Menzies transcripts.
See Defendants Exhibit 3.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act, Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Code of Judicial
Administration, Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann.
section 76-3-206(2) mandate that a transcript prepared by an
individual who is not certified cannot be used as the official
record for appellate purposes unless the parties so stipulate.
Speculation as to whether Ms. Lee was qualified and/or would have
been licensed had she applied is irrelevant where she was not in
fact certified.
Assuming, arguendo, that a transcript prepared by a
noncertified individual can be used as the official record, the
State nevertheless has the burden of establishing the accuracy of
such a transcript.

Regardless, however, of which party has the

burden, the overwhelming evidence of errors and incompetency in this
case establishes that the transcript is not adequate for appellate
review.

Where an inadequate record exists, no showing of specific

harm is required.
Significant errors causing prejudice exist throughout this
record.

- 3
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Mr. Menzies raised a distinct analysis under the state
constitution in the trial court which this Court should address on
appeal.
The prosecutor's ex parte statement in the record violates
the state and federal constitutions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH STATUTES AND RULES PRECLUDE THE
USE OF A TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY ANYONE OTHER THAN
A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AS THE OFFICIAL
RECORD ON APPEAL.
Rule 3-305, Utah Code of Judicial Administration(1988)
provides:
(10) Except as otherwise agreed, pursuant to
written stipulation and approval of the court,
transcripts prepared by anyone other than a
certified court transcriber shall not be used as
the official record of the court proceedings for
any purpose required by state statute, rule or
provision of this Code.
This rule1 echoes Mr. Menzies7 argument in Point I of his
opening brief that the Court Reporters and Stenographers Act ("the
Act"), the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act
("the Licensing Act"), Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-206(2) mandate that a transcript prepared by an

1. The Code of Judicial Administration was initially adopted in
October, 1988, after a committee spent over two years putting the
Code together; "[t]he Code consolidates into a single publication
all of the administrative rules and rules of practice which have
previously been adopted by the Judicial Council, the Boards of
Judges and the local courts and the rules of professional practice
which have been adopted by the Supreme Court." Introduction, Utah
Code of Judicial Administration (1988), p. vii; see also Foreward,
p. v. Hence, the Code of Judicial Administration did not create new
rules; instead, it consolidated previously adopted rules.

- 4
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individual who is not certified cannot be used as the official
record in a capital homicide case unless the parties so stipulate.
The State argues that the Act makes a distinction between
shorthand reporters and certified shorthand reporters, thereby
implying that noncertified reporters may appropriately act as
district court reporters under the Act.

State's Brief at 9-11. This

argument fails to consider the Act as a whole.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-56-15 requires that "[n]o person shall be appointed to the
position of shorthand reporter nor act in that capacity in any
district court . . . unless he has received a certificate from the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing

..."

(emphasis added). Hence, the Act envisions that all persons acting
as court reporters in district courts will be properly licensed.
The State also argues that

"[i]f the qualifications [of

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16(1987)] are met, the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing does not appear to have any
discretion about granting the certificate."

State's Brief at ll.2

This statement ignores the fact that the qualifications set forth in
§ 78-56-15 are broad, giving the Division discretion in assessing
whether the qualifications are themselves met.
As outlined in Mr. Menzies opening brief at 30-31, had

2. The State seems to imply by this statement that Ms. Lee would
have automatically been certified in Utah if she had applied, and
that her lack of certification therefore does not matter. Not only
is the assumption that Ms. Lee would have been automatically
certified incorrect (see Appellant's opening brief at 29-32), the
statement also ignores the importance of licensing and regulation in
professions where education, skill and knowledge are required.

- 5
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Ms. Lee applied for certification, the Division, in all likelihood,
would have determined that she did not possess the moral character
or skill and ability necessary to act as a district court reporter.
In addition, Mr. Menzies directs this Court's attention to the
Accusation contained in Addendum I of his opening brief which
demonstrates that in January, 1988, Ms. Lee was delinquent in
filing transcripts in California.

Had either the Division or Court

Administrator's office conducted a background check on Ms. Lee, they
would have ascertained this information and either not licensed
and/or not hired Ms. Lee.
The State also suggests that Ms. Lee did not need to be
certified because she was a temporary reporter, claiming that she
was appointed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17.

However, the

evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Lee was appointed as the
official reporter for Judge Uno and was not in a temporary
capacity.3

Ron Gibson, deputy court administrator, testified on

direct examination by Mr. Menzies' attorney that Ms. Lee was
appointed as the official court reporter for Judge Uno.
R. 1166:29.

Nothing in Ms. Lee's personnel file or the nature of

her employment suggest that she was hired in a temporary capacity;
in addition, a "regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter"
for Judge Uno who had neither been removed from the job or who was

3. Judge Uno did not make a specific finding as to whether Ms. Lee
was a temporary or permanent reporter.
His determination that
Ms. Lee was qualified to act as court reporter implies, however,
that she was appointed as the official reporter and was not acting
in a temporary capacity.

- 6
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suffering from a temporary disability, as required to trigger Utah
Code Ann. § 78-56-17, did not exist.4

4. The letters and memoranda contained in Ms. Lee's personnel file
repeatedly refer to her as the official court reporter. See
Defendant's Exhibit 3, Tauni Lee's personnel file and documents
therein, e.g. letter to clerk of First District Court of Appeals in
California, contained in Addendum A to this brief (indicating that
Ms. Lee "is currently serving as an official reporter in a District
Court in Utah"); Memorandum dated May 24, 1988, contained in
Addendum B to this brief (appointing temporary reporter to fill in
for Ms. Lee while Ms. Lee was on sick leave for broken finger).
In addition, Ms. Lee's position did not terminate in June,
the date of the next examination, as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-56-17.
Ms. Lee was appointed to replace Bob Lewis, who resigned to
take a position in federal district court and was not on temporary
leave or removed, as required to trigger Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17.
See Addendum C to this brief.
When questioned by the State, Ron Gibson testified that he
knew Ms. Lee was not licensed in Utah, but believed that she had a
valid California license. He testified further that he determined
that she could be appointed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17.
R. 1166:82-3, 87. Mr. Gibson is not a lawyer; rather, he is an
administrator for the Court Administrator's office. His incorrect
interpretation of a statute does not bind this Court. In addition,
(footnote continued)
his interpretation was based on incorrect information that Ms. Lee
was properly licensed in California. R. 1166:87.
Furthermore, Mr. Gibson's statements regarding the
licensing status of Ms. Lee have not been consistent. In November,
1989, when Mr. Menzies file his Motion for New Trial, Mr. Gibson
told the press that Ms. Lee had been properly licensed in Utah.
R. 1166:33. He testified on direct examination during the new trial
proceedings that she was the official reporter for Judge Uno
(R. 1166:29); his memoranda and treatment of her demonstrate that
she was a permanent, official reporter and not a temporary one. See
personnel file, Defendant's Exhibit 3. He also testified that he
became familiar with Ms. Lee in May, 1988, three months after she
was hired, and that he did not play a role in hiring her.
R. 1166:29-30. His conflicting statement that he told the district
court clerk that she could be used as a temporary reporter
(R. 1166:82-3) is the only suggestion by Mr. Gibson, the personnel
file, or anyone involved with Ms. Lee's appointment, that Ms. Lee
was appointed as a temporary reporter.
Nevertheless, even if the Court Administrator's office had
believed Ms. Lee could be appointed as a temporary reporter without
obtaining a Utah license, such belief was erroneous since the Act
(footnote continued)
- 7
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The state misreads Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17 (1953 as
amended) when it suggests that section 17 permits uncertified
persons to act as court reporters. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15
requires that anyone acting as a court reporter be certified;
section 17 merely allows persons to sit as temporary reporters
without going through an official appointment process, and limits
the duration of such temporary appointment until the next regularly
scheduled examination.
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-13 (1953 as amended)
provides for temporary licensure for persons who have "met all
license requirements except the passing of an examination".

When

the Licensing Act is read together with the Act, it is apparent that
temporary shorthand reporters must have a temporary license to
properly act in that capacity.
The State also relies on Rule 3-304(2)(A), Code of Judicial
Administration in support of its argument that all shorthand
reporters need not be certified.

The State is correct that Rule

3-304(2)(A) states:
All official court reporters and substitute
reporters serving in the district courts shall be
licensed in the State of Utah as certified
shorthand reporters by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Commerce. Pursuant to Council
guidelines, the court administrator may authorize
exceptions to this required qualification in the
event that certified shorthand reporters are not
available or an official court reporter or a

(footnote 4 continued)
expressly requires that all persons acting as court reporters be
licensed in Utah. See discussion supra at 5.
- 8
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graduate of an accredited court reporting school
is deemed competent, but is not licensed for
reasons unrelated to satisfactory performance as
an official court reporter as provided herein.
This rule was not included in the initial Code of Judicial
Administration adopted in 1988, and appeared for the first time in
the 1990 version.

The timing of the adoption of this rule and the

notoriety of the facts in the present case suggest that the
difficulties regarding Ms. Lee's tenure may well have triggered the
adoption of the rule.5
More importantly, however, Rule 3-304(2)(A) when read in
conjunction with the previously existing Rule 3-305 requires that
the parties stipulate to the use of an uncertified reporter in order
to use her work as the official record of proceedings.

Hence, even

if Rule 3-304 were in existence at the time of this trial and
applicable under the circumstances of this case, the transcript
would not be useable as an official record of proceedings.
The State fails to distinguish any of the cases cited by
Mr. Menzies in support of his argument in Point I of his brief that
a transcript prepared by a noncertified person cannot be used for

5. Even if this rule had been in effect at the time Ms. Lee was
appointed as Judge Uno's reporter, there is no showing in the
present case that the court administrator followed council
guidelines in authorizing an exception to the rule or in appointing
Ms. Lee. Nor is there any showing that licensed individuals were
not available. When Ms. Lee broke her finger less than six months
after being appointed, a temporary replacement was appointed. The
Court Administrator's office could have utilized the same procedure
in initially filling the position that it did in placing the
temporary. See Memorandum dated May 24, 1988 contained in
Addendum B to this brief. Although Ron Gibson testified that
Ms. Lee was the only applicant, there is no evidence as to how long
a vacancy existed or what efforts were made to fill the position.
- 9
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appellate review.

See, e.g.. Appellant's opening brief at 20 citing

In re David T.. 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. 4th 1976); Pullan v.
Fulbriaht. 685 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1985).

Nor does the State cite any

cases from Utah or other jurisdictions in support of its argument
that certification is not necessary.
Finally, although the State argues in Point I that even
though Ms. Lee was not certified, an official record exists in this
case, it fails to address which version of the transcript it
believes to be the "official" record.6

If this Court were to accept

the State's argument that Ms. Lee need not be certified, it would
then have to determine whether the version of the transcript which
was prepared by a noncertified notereader and proofreader or the
significantly different "California" version is the official record
in this case.

Since Ms. Lee did not prepare nor read the original

version, there is no basis for including that as the official
record.

On the other hand, the "California" version contains

numerous portions which are unintelligible and the parties and trial
judge agree that it does not make sense in certain areas.
R. 1932:27, 30, 45-6, 47, 55, 58, 62, 66; see Appellant's opening
brief at 33-4.
Judge Uno's ruling that although Ms. Lee "was not licensed

6. In its Statement of the Case at 4, the State claims that
"Judge Uno ordered that the original transcript be certified to this
Court for review of defendant's case." But see Appellant's
Statement of the Case supra at 1-2. This claim by the State in its
Statement of the Case is the only suggestion throughout the State's
brief as to which version of the transcript it believes should be
used as the official record in this case.

- 10 -

as a court reporter, she was qualified to report this trial"
(R. 1186:5) is meaningless under the statutes and rules which make
certification in Utah a necessary requisite to using a transcript
prepared by a reporter.

Furthermore, as extensively outlined by

Mr. Menzies in his opening brief at 30-32, such a position is not
supported by the evidence in this case.
Because Ms. Lee was not certified, an official record of
the proceedings does not exist in this case.
POINT II. MANDATORY REVIEW OF THIS CAPITAL
HOMICIDE CASE IS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE AN ACCURATE,
VERBATIM RECORD DOES NOT EXIST.
Although Mr. Menzies maintains that a transcript "prepared"
by an individual who is not a certified shorthand reporter cannot be
used as the official record in this case, in the event this Court
disagrees, Mr. Menzies argues, alternatively, that (1) the State
must establish the accuracy of the transcript, and (2) regardless of
which party has the burden, the overwhelming evidence in the instant
case establishes that the transcript is inaccurate and unacceptable
for appellate review.
A. THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THE
ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT.
The State relies solely on Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure in support of its argument that Mr. Menzies has the burden
of establishing the inaccuracy of the transcript.

However, Rule 11

contemplates that any transcript will be prepared by a certified
shorthand reporter.

In addition, while Rule 11 can assist in

repairing some transcripts, the rule does not discuss nor resolve a

- 11 -

situation such as the present one where a lengthy and detailed
capital homicide trial occurred, the parties cannot recall details,
and the parties are unable to agree as to what transpired.
Furthermore, Rule 11 does not expressly assign a burden to
either party; rather, it directs the trial court to settle and
correct the record.

Nor did this Court assign a burden in State v.

Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), or Emia v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043
(Utah 1985).
State v. Perry, 136 Wis.2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748, 757 (1987),
supports Mr. Menzies' argument that the State has the burden of
establishing the accuracy of this disputed transcript.

The Perry

court stated:
[T]he transcript must be established in
accordance with the burden of proof required in
the case, i.e., in a criminal case, beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the court cannot reach that
degree of certainty, it must reverse and order a
new trial.
Id. at 753.
In focusing solely on Rule 11, the State ignores Utah Code
Ann. § 78-56-6 and the presumption created therein.
opening brief at 22.

See Appellant's

The State also ignores Utah case law which

requires that "proof of the accuracy of the transcript" be supplied
in order to use it on appeal.

Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d 136

(Utah 1975); State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983).
Where an unlicensed individual prepares a transcript, the
State has the burden of proving the accuracy of the transcript in
order to use it as the official record on appeal.

- 12 -

In the present

case, where the State presented almost no evidence regarding the
accuracy of the transcript, it has failed to sustain that burden.
B. NEITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT IS
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE "MEANINGFUL APPELLATE
REVIEW" IN THIS CASE.
Even if this Court were to place the burden on Mr. Menziesf
the abundant evidence regarding Ms. Lee's lack of knowledge and
skill, along with the numerous errors and inaccuracies/ establish
that neither transcript is adequate for appellate review.
The State acknowledges that numerous errors occur
throughout the transcripts, but claims that such errors do not
require a new trial since Mr. Menzies is not guaranteed a "perfect
transcript."

In its attempt to minimize the seriousness of the

errors and inaccuracies, the State fails to address all of the
errors and problems raised by Mr. Menzies, along with the overall
unreliability of either version of the transcript, and fails to
acknowledge the importance of a transcript which assures meaningful
appellate review.

In light of the gravity of the offense and

severity of the penalty in the present case, meaningful appellate
review is precluded by the inaccurate and inadequate transcription.
See State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (N.C. 1984) (per curiam)
(reversing capital homicide conviction and sentence under court's
supervisory powers and in the interests of justice where "meaningful
appellate review . . . is completely precluded by the entirely
inaccurate and inadequate transcription . . . " ) .
In State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d at 751, cited by the State on
pages 15, 17, and 18 of its brief, the court emphasized the

- 13 -

importance of a full transcript which, "beyond a reasonable doubt,
portrays in a way that is meaningful to the particular appeal
exactly what happened in the course of the trial."

Id.

The Perry

court explicitly acknowledged the importance of an accurate record
for assessing both errors raised at trial and plain error.
754.

Id. at

In reversing the defendants convictions, the court pointed

out that "[t]he usual remedy where the transcript deficiency is such
that there cannot be a meaningful appeal is reversal with directions
that there be a new trial (citations omitted)."

Id.

State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), supports
Mr. Menzies' argument that the transcript in this case is not
sufficient for meaningful appellate review.

Taylor suggests that

where significant portions of the transcript are inaudible,
unintelligible or uncertain, criminal convictions must be reversed
for a new trial.
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
804 P.2d 1232 (1990), provides little guidance for this Court since
the factual scenario is different.

Jonas was a noncapital case, the

effect of lack of certification of the reporter was not considered,
and decisions from the court of appeals do not control this Court.7

7. In Jonas, the appellant attacked only a small portion of the
transcript. Ms. Lee substituted for the regular reporter for a
portion of a day in a trial which lasted several days. Ms. Lee
disappeared without preparing the requested transcript; a different
reporter obtained Ms. Lee's notes and prepared the contested
transcript. The "(illegible)" notation in Jonas refers to Ms. Lee's
notes taken in that case.
Counsel for Mr. Jonas was not aware that Ms. Lee was not
certified and that issue was not raised for the trial court or court
(footnote continued)
- 14 -

State v, Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), also offers
very little guidance in the instant case.8

In Moosman, the

deficiency in the transcript involved a single hearing which had not
been transcribed, and did not permeate the entire record.

A limited

aspect of the hearing was at issue—whether the defendant had been
present and waived his right to a jury trial.

The prosecutor and

apparently the judge remembered that the hearing had occurred where
the defendant was present and waived his right to a jury.

The

surrounding circumstances in the case supported such a finding.

By

contrast, in the present case, the errors permeate the entire
transcript prepared by Ms. Lee and the parties are unable to
adequately reconstruct the details of the proceedings of each day.
See generally State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d at 837.
The State argues that the transcript should be used because
the errors could be fixed or are inconsequential.9

State's Brief at

(footnote 7 continued)
of appeals in Jonas. Nor was any other evidence introduced in Jonas
regarding Ms. Lee's licensing problems in California, her inability
to take down or read notes, or her lack of qualifications and moral
fitness. The only issue regarding the transcript presented to the
court in Jonas was whether the proceedings under Rule 11, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure utilizing a certified shorthand reporter to
read the notes of the reporter who was present, provided an adequate
transcript to address the issues raised in that case. Jonas
therefore has very little impact on this Court's decision in the
instant case.
8. Although Moosman involved a capital homicide charge, the
defendant was not sentenced to death. Therefore, the heightened
concerns applicable to death penalty cases were not applicable in
Moosman.
9. In making this argument, it is again unclear as to which version
of the transcript the State is discussing.
(footnote continued)
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19, 23-9.

First, the State claims that the transcript could have

been reconstructed through proposed modifications had Mr. Menzies
accepted all of the State's proposals.

State's Brief at 19. 10

This

position is contrary to the stipulation of the parties in the trial
court that Mr. Menzies had made all reasonable efforts to
reconstruct this transcript under Rule 11, and that such
reconstruction was not possible.

R. 1932:79.

The State's position

also fails to take into account the fact that this case was in the
trial court for more than a year while the parties attempted to
reconstruct the record, and numerous proposed modifications were

(footnote 9 continued)
Apparently in support of its argument that the errors are
inconsequential, the State points out that on November 7, 1990,
Judge Uno was prepared to certify the transcript to this Court.
Judge Uno's statement, quoted by the State on page 21 of its brief,
was made before the judge saw the discrepancies between Ms. Lee's
notes and the notereader's version, and does not resolve the
significant added concern regarding the accuracy of the original
version which is raised by a comparison of that version with
Ms. Lee's notes. It was also made at a time when the transcripts of
two hearings, one of which was the penalty phase discovery hearing
which impacts directly on an issue on appeal, were missing.
10. The State relies on People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 218 P.2d
769, 773, cert, denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950), and People v. Chessman,
52 Cal.2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, 690-2, cert, denied, 361 U.S. 925
(1959). Both Chessman decisions were written long before the United
States Supreme Court significantly altered capital punishment in
this country with its decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2716, 33 L.Ed.2d 46 (1972). In addition, Chessman is
factually distinct from the present case regarding not only the ease
in reconstruction, but also the fact that notes taken by an
official, apparently licensed, court reporter existed. More recent
decisions, such as State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836, reach a
different conclusion than that reached in the Chessman decisions.
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submitted or stipulated to by Mr. Menzies.11

It also fails to

consider the impracticability of reconstructing an entire trial of
this length.

See Felton v. State, 523 So.2d 775, 776 (Fla. Dist.

App. 1988) ("Reconstructions of an entire trial are relatively rare
due to the extreme difficulties in preparing same; people's memories
of a complex trial involving many witnesses is rarely such that a

11. Mr. Menzies filed proposed modifications in December 8, 1989.
On December 13, 1989, he filed a supplement containing further
proposed modifications. The parties stipulated to numerous changes
in the transcript early in these proceedings. Mr. Menzies filed a
renewed Motion to Set Aside Judgment and/or for New Trial on
November 26, 1990 (R. 1799-1800; 1888-1907), outlining numerous
areas where the transcript was incorrect. On December 17, 1990, he
filed additional proposed modifications. R. 1818-1908. Mr. Menzies
also stipulated to many of the State's proposed changes and
responded to all of its motions.
The State suggests that Mr. Menzies did not respond to its
proposed changes filed on November 30, 1990. State's Brief at 21.
That proposal contained only two modifications, (1) that the reading
of the jury verdict be changed to "not guilty" instead of "guilty"
as reflected in the transcript and (2) that Carlton Way's
transcription of pages 888-894 be substituted for the transcription
done by the notereader. Mr. Menzies stipulated to the second
proposed change, and the transcript prepared by Carlton Way is
included in this record. The first change outlined by the State in
it November 30, 1990 motion had already been agreed upon by the
parties and ordered by the court over a year before the State
"proposed" the change.
In addition, on three days' notice, trial counsel traveled
to California and spent over three weeks with Ms. Lee and a
representative of the State going over Ms. Lee's notes; this abrupt
scheduling was the result of the trial judge changing an order that
he had renewed on a number of occasions that Ms. Lee travel to Utah
for the process. The abrupt departure and extensive amount of time
involved created great hardship for trial counsel and the office of
trial counsel.
To now argue that Mr. Menzies has not made every effort to
reconstruct this transcript flies in the face of the stipulation of
the parties, the order of the trial judge, and the monumental
efforts made by defense counsel in this case.
Furthermore, if modification would cure this transcript,
the appropriate remedy would be to send it back to the trial court
for further reconstruction. This is a remedy expressly rejected by
the State as being counterproductive and too time-consuming.
- 17 -

proper record can ever be reconstructed given the passage of
time."); Hardv v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280, 11 L.Ed.2d 331,
84 S.Ct. 424 (1964) ("Recollections and notes of trial counsel and
of others are apt to be faulty and incomplete.").

Finally, the

State's position fails to take in to account the obvious fact that
Mr. Menzies is not required to stipulate to a change that he does
not believe occurred or which he cannot recall.
The State did not address all of the specific inaccuracies
raised by Mr. Menzies; nor did it address his concern as to the
overwhelming inaccuracy and unreliability of these transcripts where
(1) numerous significant and obvious errors exist in the
transcripts; (2) Ms. Lee was not certified in Utah nor currently in
good standing in California; (3) Ms. Lee's work history both
immediately before and after her tenure in Judge Uno's courtroom
demonstrated her inability to adequately transcribe proceedings;
(4) the original transcript was not prepared nor read by Ms. Lee,
and numerous discrepancies exist between her notes and the
notereader's version; and (5) Ms. Lee had obvious difficulty in
taking accurate notes in court.
In addressing specific errors, the State's approach is to
attempt to minimize the importance of each individual error without
ever addressing the effect of the multitude of such errors, the
impracticality of attempting to modify this transcript, or the
concerns listed above.

For example, the State claims that Ms. Lee's

failure to take down voir dire answers is permissible since she used
a symbol which referred her to Judge Uno's "script."
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This position

ignores the fact that the "script" was for Judge Uno's guidance
only; that he was free to vary the way in which he asked questions;
and on at least one occasion, which Ms. Lee then erroneously
reported as the question asked of a number of jurors, Judge Uno
asked a question in a manner which varied from the "script."
Judge Uno did not tell Ms. Lee to stop taking notes; there
is no way of ascertaining whether the judge in fact asked the
questions since Ms. Lee apparently stopped taking notes.
The State also claims that Ms. Lee could appropriately use
asterisks in place of taking down verbatim the trial court's
admonishments.

However, Ms. Lee used asterisks for a multitude of

occurrences, and in reading the notes, one is left to guess whether
a particular asterisk was actually an admonishment or some other
occurrence.

In addition, in this high publicity case where one

juror was contacted by an anonymous caller and informed of
Mr. Menzies' criminal record (T. 2367), jury admonitions are
critical.

(See, e.g., T. 2369.)

Without exact words, the nature of

the admonishments cannot be ascertained.12
Use of police reports and the trial judge's notes to

12. In the Table of Contents contained in Addendum M to Appellant's
opening brief, an appellate issue regarding the tainting of the jury
is listed. Mr. Menzies maintains that he was denied his right to
due process and a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury as the
result of several occurrences during the course of the trial.
During the trial, one juror fainted during the medical testimony
(T. 1622), Ms. Lee became distraught (T. 1633-4), a second juror
received the anonymous phone call (T. 2369), and a third juror had a
breakdown in front of the other jurors (T. 2396). The trial judge
sequestered the jury (T. 394-5), and defense counsel made several
motions for mistrial based on these irregular occurrences (T. 2369,
2398-9, 2409-10, 2473).
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embellish testimony and making up portions of the transcript results
in an unreliable and unuseable transcript.

Attempting to understand

this transcript in context is difficult since it is lengthy and
requires reliance on other unreliable portions of transcript; it is
also time consuming and subject to various interpretations, as
evidenced by the hearing on December 19, 1990.
The State also attempts to minimize the unintelligible and
erroneous portions of argument by arguing that this Court will
review this transcript regardless of whether an objection is made.
The fallacy of this argument is apparent on page 2 of the State's
brief where it asserts that this Court should review the
constitutional arguments which Mr. Menzies raised in the trial court
for plain error only.

See also State's brief in State v. David

Young, Case No. 890424. A different standard of review governs
where an issue is not preserved at trial, even in capital cases.
In the remaining errors it chooses to address, the State
continues to attempt to minimize each individual error and to attack
Mr. Menzies for not reconstructing the record.13

The State does not

deny that most of these errors exist and does not directly address
Mr. Menzies' argument in this part that where errors of this
significance and numerosity exist, the accuracy of the transcript
cannot be established.

13. Contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Menzies has stipulated
to a number of changes it refers to in its brief, including
"archive" and "Rorschach" test. State's brief at 29. These errors
are nevertheless indicative of Ms. Lee's inability to accurately
take down what is said in court.
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Regardless of which party has the burden, the extensive
number of errors and inaccuracies in this transcript establish that
it cannot be used as the official record in this appeal.
C. NO SHOWING OF SPECIFIC PREJUDICE IS REQUIRED
IN A CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASE WHERE AN ACCURATE
TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST.
In his opening brief at 36-8, Mr. Menzies argues that where
an accurate transcript does not exist in a death penalty case, no
showing of specific prejudice is required to set aside a capital
homicide conviction and sentence.
Mr. Menzies cites a number of cases for this proposition,
including Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212, 213, 214 n.5 (Tex. Cr. App.
1987); Little v. State, 97 S.W.2d 479, 180 (Tex. Cr. App. 1936);
Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 (Okl. Cr. 1988); Kelly v. State,
692 P.2d 563, 565 (Okl. Cr. 1984) (Brett, J., concurring); DeLap v.
State, 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977).

State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836,

837 (N.C. 1984) (per curiam), also supports Mr. Menzies' argument.
In its response, the State fails to acknowledge,
distinguish or otherwise refer to any of the cases cited by
Mr. Menzies in this subpart.

Instead, the State relies on

noncapital cases (including the misdemeanor case of Mayer v.
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971)) for the proposition that
"[alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are
permissible . . . ."

State's brief at 30.

In a capital homicide

case which must be reviewed for plain erorr, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-206 and the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal
constitution require an accurate, verbatim transcript of proceedings.
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POINT III. MR. MENZIES WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE
FROM THE USE OF EITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT.
Mr. Menzies included this point in his opening brief as an
alternative argument in the event that this Court were to disagree
with his position in Point II.C of his opening brief and were to
require a showing of specific prejudice.

He continues to maintain

that he need not show specific harm since (1) neither Ms. Lee nor
the notereader who prepared the original version were certified, and
(2) the transcript is significantly inaccurate.
In attempting to minimize the significance of the errors in
this transcript, the State makes a circular argument, relying on
other disputed portions of the transcript to support its arguments.
The State also acknowledges that certain portions of the transcript
are erroneous, then offers its interpretation of what occurred.
Such an approach points out the difficulty of using this transcript
in a case of this magnitude; as the appeals progress and the parties
encounter unreliable portions of the transcript, each party will be
left to argue to this Court its version of what was really said.
Such an approach is unacceptable in a case of this size and severity.
In addition, without addressing the substance of the issues
raised by Mr. Menzies, or the overall impact of using a wholly
unreliable transcript, the State claims that none of the numerous
errors in this transcript matter.
Contrary to the State7s claims, Ms. Lee's failure to
accurately record the proceedings affects a number of issues in this
case; the State's argument, taken to its logical extreme, suggests
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that nothing of significance occurred during this six-week trial.
The evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Lee failed
to record all of the voir dire questioning and failed to accurately
record that which she did take down.
reversible error.

Failure to record voir dire is

See Taylor, 664 P.2d 439.

The repeated inaccuracy of numbers throughout the
transcripts demonstrates that no number, even where the notereader
and Ms. Lee agree, is reliable.

Numbers are significant in this

case in regard to dates of occurrences; distance at which a man
believed to be the perpetrator of this crime was viewed; the amount
of money and cigarettes, if any, missing from the Gas-A-Mat14; rules
and statutes relied upon; and a number of other areas.

The State's

assertion that the numbers can be corrected by looking at the
context fails to consider the inaccuracy of the remainder of the
transcript, the importance of inconsistencies in testimony, or the
amount of time and difficulty already encountered in an attempt to
fix these transcripts.
Additional errors in this transcript prejudice
Mr. Menzies.

For example, one of the appellate issues in this case

14. For example, the testimony regarding how many packs of
cigarettes and how much money were missing varied. Employees of
Gas-A-Mat initially determined that a larger number of each was
missing and so informed the media. After the media released the
numbers, Gas-A-Mat revised them significantly. These discrepancies
were important in three areas: (1) whether the State could
establish that anything was missing in support of its robbery
theory, and (2) whether Britton had obtained his information from
the media rather than from an admission by Mr. Menzies, and
(3) whether the money found in the umbrella could be linked to the
Gas-A-Mat.
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relates to the fainting of a juror during the medical testimony.
See footnote 12 supra at 19. Ms. Lee's transcript does not reflect
the incident as recalled by persons who were present.

T. 1622;

R. 1932:74-5. After the juror is removed, nothing occurs in the
transcript regarding the incident and the parties immediately pursue
an unrelated argument; the transcript does not reveal whether the
jury was removed, a recess was taken, or any record of the incident
was made by defense counsel.

Furthermore, shortly after the juror

fainted in the midst of an unrelated discussion, the court stated:
What particularly happened during the jurors—
during the course of the trial. Rick would be a
little more subtle or sophisticated.
T. 1624.

The occurrences surrounding the fainting of the juror

directly affect this appeal and are not adequately recorded.
Significant errors occur throughout this transcript which
cause prejudice to Mr. Menzies.
POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW MR. MENZIES'
CLAIMS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION.
Mr. Menzies has outlined a distinct analysis under
article 1, sections 9, 10 and 12 and article VIII, section 5 of the
Utah Constitution.

His argument is that the failure to provide an

adequate transcript for meaningful appellate review reaches
constitutional proportions under the Utah Constitution.

See

Appellant's opening brief at 45-7. Mr. Menzies raised and argued
this issue in the trial court.

R. 1223-5, 1237-49, 1630-2.

POINT V. REMOVING THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS
DOES NOT REMOVE THE PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE
REMARKS.
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In a hearing held in this Court on January 2, 1990,
appellate counsel for the State explicitly outlined the details
contained in the prosecutor's ex parte statement.

Since the State

has informed this Court of the details of the statement, the
statement itself is highly unusual and improper, and the statement
reflects on the lack of integrity and qualification of Ms. Lee, it
is appropriate to keep the remarks in the record even though they
are not part of the "official record11 of trial proceedings in this
case.

Mr. Menzies continues to maintain that a statement of this

nature made by the State and included in the transcript violates his
right to due process, equal protection and appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Menzies respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this *%D day of May, 1991.
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STATE OF UTAH

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102
(801)533 6371

GORDON R. HALL

RONALD W. GIBSON

CHIEF JUSTICE

DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR

CHAIRMAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL

JOHN F. MCNAMARA

WILLIAM C. VICKREY

JUVENILE COURT

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

ADMINISTRATOR

Hay 11, 1988

Mr. Jim Campbell
Deputy Clerk
Court of Appeals, First District
State of California
State Building
San Francisco, California 94102
Dear Mr. Campbell:
I have been provided a copy of the order entered by the
First Appellate District of the Court of Appeals in the cases of
Golden Oak Enterprisesf Inc.. et al vs. Manor Development Co.P Inc.f
et al. No. 123722, and, Cindy Lee Bebbring vs. Jess Eugene Hebbingf
No. 48395, wherein the Court of Appeals declared Tauni Byrd not to
be competent to act as an official reporter in the State of
California.
Ms. Byrd is currently serving as an official reporter in a
District Court in Utah. As the employing entity, it is important
that we learn of the basis for the determination of incompetency if
possible. It would be most helpful if you could provide us with as
specific
information as is available clarifying whether the
determination was due to the quality of transcripts, failure to
provide transcripts timely, personnel issues or some other basis.
Any assistance which you can provide to us in this matter
will be greatly appreciated.

Ronald W. Gibson
Deputy Court Administrator

cc:

Judge Raymond Uno
Tauni Byrd
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Donald Jones
Division of Registration

ADDENDUM B

STATE OF UTAH

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102
(801)533-6371

GORDON R. HALL

RONALD W. GIBSON

CHIEF JUSTICE

DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR

CHAIRMAN, JUDICIAL COUNCIL

JOHN F. MCNAMARA

WILL1AM C. V1CKREY

M E M O R A N D U M

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

TO:

From:'
Re:

JUVENILE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR

Chief Justice Gordon R. Hall
Presiding Judge Scott Daniels
District Judge Raymond Uno
Court Reporter Tauni (Byrd) Lee
ident, USRA, Donald Jones
ibson
Official Court Reporter Tauni Lee

For the purpose of keeping you fully advised of developments
in the matter of Official Court Reporter Tauni Lee, I relate to you
the following events.
On Monday, May 23, 1988, Ms. Lee contacted me by telephone
and informed me that she had suffered a broken finger during the
preceding weekend while practicing karate with her husband. As a
result of the accident, Ms. Lee indicated that the treating doctor
placed the finger in a splint which would remain in place for 3
weeks. Therefore, she would be unable to perform her duties as
official court reporter during that period.
I placed Ms. Lee on sick leave from May 23, 1988 thru June
10, 1988. She indicated that the disability would not interfere
with her ability to continue preparation of the transcript in the
case of The State of Utah vs. Ralph Lerov Menziesf and that she
would continue to meet the time schedule described in my memorandum
of May 17, 1988. I reaffirm my prior statement that our arrangement
for leave with pay did not constitute an extention of time for
preparation of the transcript which lies solely within the authority
of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, Mrs. Geraldine Court, 3rd District Court
secretary, reported that she had exhausted every means of obtaining
substitute court reporting services to serve during this period in
Judge Uno's court, both from other officials within the court and
all freelance private reporters, without success.
In order to resolve this matter and assure that Judge Uno's
court continues to function without interruption for lack of an
official reporter, I have entered into an agreement with Ms. Viki
Hatton of Associated Professional Reporters to provide reporting

page 2
May 24, 1988
services during the entire period of absence of Ms. Lee. Our
agreement provides that in consideration for the firm's commitment
to provide the services we will pay the standard per diem for all
days of the period regardless of whether the court conducts hearings
and the services are rendered or not. The firm has assigned Mr. Ken
Allen to this responsibility who is certified in the State of Idaho
and has taken the certification test in Utah with the test results
still pending. I have agreed to Mr. Allen's temporary assignment.
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